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American involvement in Samoa in the late 19th Century constitutes one
of the most extraordinary episodes in the diplomatic history of the
United States.1 During a period of intense opposition to foreign
entanglements and overseas expansion, the United States was embroiled
in the affairs of a remote island group where American strategic interests
were almost nonexistent and the American economic stake was insigni-
ficant. At a time when the expansive policies of William H. Seward and
Ulysses S. Grant were handily defeated in the Congress, the Alaska
treaty was ridiculed, James G. Blaine's pan-Americanism ended in
failure, and Hawaiian annexation remained a task for the future, the
United States was ready to enter into agreements regarding Samoa that
constituted, in a sense, the nation's first entangling alliance since the
French treaty of 1778.2 Yet it is still far from clear what attracted
American interest to Samoa. The standard diplomatic history textbooks
offer no convincing explanation; all would seem to agree with Thomas
A. Bailey that "there was something remarkable about the determination
of the United States, ten years before the Spanish-American War, to go
to the very brink of hostilities with Germany rather than yield negligible
commercial and questionable strategic advantages in faraway Samoa."3
Clearly the United States had no vital interests in the Samoan archipe-
lago. Why she was so deeply involved in that part of the world for almost
30 years has remained, therefore, a mystery.
It is the contention of this essay that United States involvement in
Samoa can be explained only in terms of the idea of America's Pacific
destiny that existed in the minds of American policy makers. William
Stuart Anderson received his Ph.D. in American History from Claremont Graduate
School, California in 1978. His major field of interest is igth Century American foreign
relations.
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H. Seward's vision of the future of the Pacific is familiar to most students
of the history of American foreign relations. "The Pacific Ocean," the
senator from New York told his colleagues in 1852, "its shores, its
islands, and the vast regions beyond, will become the chief theatre of
events in the world's great hereafter."4 Long after Seward had passed
from the scene, many Americans in positions of power continued to
believe in his vision and to act on their belief. For a succession of
Washington officials in the late 19th Century, in both the executive and
legislative branches of the government, Samoa, with its harbor of Pago
Pago, occupied a conspicuous position in the prognosis of America's
future in the Pacific. Samoa was important not for any present American
interests there, but as a future outpost of an American military and
commercial domain. For some, Samoa's chief importance was as a
coaling station for merchantmen plying the trade routes to Asia and the
South Pacific; for others, its importance was as a naval base for defense
of this trade, as well as defense of the West Coast and the future isthmian
canal. For all, however, Samoa's real value lay in the role it was to play
in the not-too-distant future, when America had burst out of its insular
shell and established itself as the paramount influence in the vast regions
of the Pacific. When that time came, control of the Samoan Islands
would be vital to the United States. It was for this reason that a succes-
sion of administrations in Washington struggled to maintain American
influence in Samoa until the time came when the American public was
ready to sanction American expansion there, and the acquisition of the
wonderful harbor of Pago Pago.
Though the United States had had treaty relations with Samoa since
1839,5 the archipelago was practically unknown in Washington until
American commercial interests began to penetrate Samoa in the early
1870s.6 Already by 1872, however, the Navy Department and the Grant
administration were aware of Pago Pago's importance as a South Pacific
harbor. A letter from Captain Wakeman, of the Webb steamship line, to
his employer, William H. Webb, was forwarded to Secretary of the Navy
George M. Robeson. Pago Pago, Captain Wakeman declared, was "the
most perfectly land-locked harbor that exists in the Pacific Ocean." The
Samoan Islands occupied a commanding position in the mid-Pacific, the
captain said, "with control of the commerce of all the islands which are
contiguous to this point," and with Australia and New Zealand practi-
cally at their doorstep. Wakeman believed that no other island group was
better suited for a naval station and a coal depot for commercial vessels.
The future of Samoa was brilliant.7
The actions of another ship captain soon increased the interest of the
Grant administration in Samoan affairs. Commander Richard W. Meade
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of the U. S. Navy signed a treaty with the chiefs of Tutuila in February
1872, granting the United States an exclusive right to a naval station at
Pago Pago. In return for this privilege, Meade promised that the United
States would extend its protection to the Samoans. Meade's action was
taken without consultation with his superiors or instructions from the
administration, and although Grant urged the Senate to ratify the treaty
(with modification of the protectorate clause), the Senate refused even
to consider the matter.8 Grant then resorted to sending a special agent to
Samoa, Colonel Albert B. Steinberger, to keep an eye on affairs in the
islands and to impress the Samoans with the continuing interest of the
United States in their happiness and welfare. Steinberger's subsequent
activities in Samoa, where he established himself as virtual premier, won
for the United States the great esteem of the Samoans and led indirectly
to the 1878 treaty between Secretary of State William M. Evarts and the
Samoan envoy Le Mamea.9
What is less well known about American interest in Samoa during
the Grant administration is the extent to which American officials
predicated their actions upon their belief in the future importance of
Samoa. President Grant, always an exponent of insular expansion, spoke
glowingly in his 1872 message on the Meade treaty of "the advantageous
position of Tutuila."10 Commander Meade himself was strongly in-
fluenced by instructions from the American minister at Honolulu,
Henry A. Pierce, who had written to him to clarify the objects of his
South Seas cruise before he sailed for Samoa. "It is of great importance
to the future interests of our country in the South Pacific," said Pierce,
that Meade should proceed as soon as possible to Samoa to promote
American interests "present and contemplated" there. Pago Pago was
by far the best and most commodious harbor in the South Seas, and
would soon be the site of a coaling station for steamships operating
between San Francisco and Australia. "In view of the future domination
of the U. States in the N. & S. Pacific Oceans," it was extremely
important that Samoa should be under American control.11
Minister Pierce clearly envisioned a great destiny for the United
States in the Pacific. What is more telling, however, is that Grant's able
Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, also presumed Samoa's future
importance and acted on it. In his initial instructions to Colonel
Steinberger in 1873, Fish pointed out that "it is not unlikely that perhaps
in the not distant future the interests of the United States may require
not only a naval station in the Samoan group, but a harbor where their
steam and other vessels may freely and securely frequent." Steinberger
was to provide the government with full and accurate information on
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Samoan affairs in order to facilitate the United States securing a harbor
there.12
Secretary Fish was no less certain of Samoa's potential value to the
United States when he wrote his 1874 instructions to Steinberger, prior
to the latter's second voyage to the islands. But in this instance, Fish
was more cautious as regarded the possibility of action in the near future.
"It is more than doubtful," he told Steinberger regretfully, " . . . whether
these considerations would be sufficient to satisfy our people that the
annexation of those islands to the United States is essential to our safety
and prosperity."13
Hence a number of important individuals in the United States
government in the early 1870s were already anticipating Samoa's future
importance to the nation. Meade's abortive treaty of 1872 was largely
the result of this anticipation. President Grant thought a naval station at
Tutuila would be extremely advantageous. Secretary of the Navy
Robeson urged in 1872 that a coaling station be established at Pago
Pago.14 Most significant, Colonel Albert B. Steinberger was dispatched
to Samoa mainly because, as Secretary Fish put it, the interests of the
United States "in the not distant future" might require a naval base and
a harbor for merchant vessels in the Samoan group. Samoa was important
for the role it was to play in the future rather than for its present status.
The vision of America's destiny in the Pacific was already beginning to
encompass the islands of Samoa.
Samoa became of much greater importance to the United States in
the 1880s, as several European powers relentlessly swallowed up the
other island kingdoms of the South Pacific. France took Tahiti in 1880
and the New Hebrides in 1886. Great Britain, which had claimed Fiji
in 1874, ten years later divided up New Guinea with Germany. Spain
took the Carolines in 1885. And Germany moved into the Solomons and
the Marshall Islands in 1886. The United States was well aware of what
was occurring in the South Pacific, and of the implications for the
American foothold at Samoa. In 1888, Secretary of State Thomas F.
Bayard reminded the American minister at Berlin, G. H. Pendleton,
that as a result of recent European advances in the area, "of the vast
aggregate of territory in the Pacific Ocean, but a few island groups . . .
remain today as independent and autonomous." In view of this fact,
Bayard told Pendleton, "it is necessary to emphasize the importance
attached by this Government to the maintenance of the rights to which
the United States has become entitled in any of the few remaining
regions now under independent and autonomous native governments in
the Pacific Ocean."15 Samoa, in addition to being strategically located
and in possession of a superb harbor, was the last island group in the
South Pacific where the United States had a political foothold. Because
the United States was to play such an active role in future developments
in the Pacific, Samoa could not be allowed to fall to a European rival.
A belief in the archipelago's eventual value, in combination with the
continuing opposition of American public and congressional opinion to
overseas expansion, largely determined the history of American involve-
ment in Samoa for the remainder of the century. It was obvious, after
the multitude of frustrations suffered by the expansionists Seward and
Grant, that the national opinion would not allow the United States to
acquire territory in or extend its protection to Samoa. On the other hand,
a succession of administrations in Washington was unwilling to see
Samoa fall to another power: to Germany, which had the largest
commercial stake in the islands, or to Great Britain, which was being
pressured by New Zealand to acquire Samoa in order to protect the
northern approaches to New Zealand itself. The natural policy for the
United States to follow in these circumstances was one of maintaining
Samoan independence until public opinion had been converted to an
acceptance of expansion. The United States would seek to maintain the
status quo in the islands, sustaining the American presence there and
preventing Samoa from falling into British or German hands, until the
American public would sanction at least the acquisition of Pago Pago.
The course of events subsequent to Steinberger's mission demonstrates
that this was indeed the policy followed by the United States.
In 1877, the Samoan envoy Le Mamea arrived in Washington to
request either annexation of the islands or an American protectorate. He
was referred to Assistant Secretary of State Frederick W. Seward, son
of the famed expansionist, who told him that the American people,
unfortunately, had changed their opinion of expansion since the great
years of Manifest Destiny in the 1840s and 1850s. They now looked with
disfavor on schemes for extending the national boundaries. Seward
"believed this dread of national expansion was a passing phase," but he
recognized that "while it lasted, it had to be reckoned with." President
Hayes, Secretary Evarts, and the rest of the Cabinet told Le Mamea the
same thing: Samoa could not be annexed, nor could a protectorate be
extended, because the Senate would not consent to any treaty that cost
the government money or placed it under an obligation.16
It was important, however, that something be done at this time to
protect the American position in Samoa. The islands were in constant
turmoil, with rival chiefs vying incessantly for the throne. The near
anarchy in the islands presented the Germans and the British with a
convenient pretext to seize control. To head off such a development, the
American consul at Apia, Gilderoy W. Griffin, was instructed in July
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1877 to do all in his power "to aid in maintaining a good and permanent
government on the Islands."17 The greatest threat to Samoan indepen-
dence came from Great Britain, which was still under pressure from the
New Zealanders to seize the islands.
Apparently because Washington was concerned with maintaining
Samoan independence, Le Mamea's mission to the United States
resulted in the treaty of 1878 between the kingdom of Samoa and the
government of the United States.18 The United States was granted
rights—though not exclusive rights—to a naval station at Pago Pago; in
return, the United States agreed to extend its "good offices" in any
dispute between Samoa and a third government. A New York Times
editorial published a few weeks after the signing of the treaty suggested
that the major reason it was entered into was "to anticipate the diplomatic
flank movement of Sir Arthur Gordon, Governor of Fiji," for the
annexation of Samoa to the British Empire. "The intrinsic importance
of the naval and supply station acquired by the treaty, and the precedent
it creates in our history as a nation," concluded the editorial, "will cause
its practical attainment to be watched for with curiosity and interest."19
The United States thus stood ready from 1878 on to claim a voice in
any dispute between Samoa and the government of Great Britain or
Germany. While the "good offices" clause of the 1878 treaty did not in
any way obligate the United States to act, it is remarkable, considering
the temper of the Times, that such a treaty could have been ratified
unanimously by the Senate. It is significant that in 1878 the only other
American treaties that included "good offices" clauses were the two with
China and Japan, both signed in 1858. Also, it should be noted that the
only additional "good offices" treaty signed and ratified by the United
States in the entire 19th Century was the 1882 treaty with Korea.20 Thus
all four such treaties were with countries that looked out on the Pacific.
Here was another indication of America's concern with that part of
the world.
During the late 1870s and early 1880s, America's interest in Samoa
steadily increased, while the policy of maintaining the Samoan status quo
continued in operation. In September of 1879 the United States commit-
ment was expanded when Consul Thomas M. Dawson, acting on his
own authority and in concert with the American naval officer on duty
at Apia, entered into a municipal convention with the German and
British representatives for tripartite control of the Apia district. Dawson's
explanation for his action was to the point. If he and Captain Chandler
had not acted, he informed Washington, "Chaos and Anarchy would
have assumed sway once more in Apia," presenting the British with a
justification for acting alone and gaining an advantage that would have
led to a British-controlled Samoa. "It seemed much better, therefore,
to share than to lose all interest in the . . . foreign authority exercised
here." It was Dawson's conviction that he would have been "severely
censured" by the State Department if he had allowed the United States
"to lose an equal part in the control of affairs here with other Govern-
ments."21 A better statement of American policy in Samoa could hardly
be hoped for. Dawson's conduct in connection with the municipal
convention was approved by the State Department.22
Such entanglements were out of all proportion to the tiny American
commercial interest that existed in Samoa throughout the period.
Exports to the islands of the Pacific, including Australia and New
Zelaand, amounted to less than 14 million dollars in 1885, and only
slightly more than 16 million in 1890. This was in comparison to 600
million dollars worth of exports to Europe in 1885 and 21 million dollars
worth to Asia, and to 683 million dollars worth to Europe in 1890 and
20 million dollars worth to Asia. The high point of Pacific exports was
not reached until 1899, and even then less than 30 million dollars worth
of American goods were shipped to the Pacific, compared to 936 million
dollars worth to Europe and 49 million dollars worth to Asia. Imports
from the Pacific throughout the period were even smaller.23 As for Samoa
itself, net exports of American goods to the islands in 1886 amounted to
just $150,000, and in 1887 only six American vessels delivered cargoes
to Apia.24 Yet Americans continued to speak glowingly of Samoa's
commercial value. Gustavus Go ward, the United States commercial
agent at Pago Pago, reported to Assistant Secretary of State Seward in
1878: "The Samoan archipelago is now, by reason of its geographical
position in the center of Polynesia, lying in the course of vessels from
San Francisco to Auckland, from Panama to Sydney, and from Val-
paraiso to China and Japan . . . the most valuable group in the South
Pacific." Goward thought that a naval station at Pago Pago would give
the United States control of a large part of Polynesia. This was a matter
of such paramount importance to the economy of the West Coast of the
United States, he concluded, that businessmen there should take an
active interest in Samoan affairs.25 Even more positive about Samoa's
future commercial importance was Consul George H. Bates, who had
been sent to Samoa in 1886 by Secretary Bayard to investigate conditions
there. Bates informed Bayard that Samoa was as important to the future
commerce of the South Pacific as Hawaii was to the North Pacific. Once
the anticipated interoceanic canal was dug across the isthmus of Panama,
Hawaii and Samoa would be the two keys to "maritime dominion in the
Pacific." Bates went on to urge that the United States government
connect itself "indissolubly" with Samoa so as to forestall the possibility
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of losing the opportunity to control the future commerce of the Pacific,
"which . . . must, from the immense number of inhabited islands alone,
be of such magnitude as will make all present conjectures seem but
trifling." He concluded with an admonition that the United States keep
a sharp eye out to protect its position in Samoa: "Having . . . so long
ago acquired this foothold in the South Pacific, it would be short-sighted
indeed if we were to permit the advantage of this action to slip away
from us by leaving the way open to European domination in this
group."26
At the same time that some Americans were looking forward to
Samoa's future commercial value, the navy was also taking a deeper
interest in the archipelago. In 1880 and 1889 cargoes of coal were
delivered to Pago Pago to testify to American treaty rights.27 A survey
of the reports of the Navy Department from Grant to McKinley reveals
that Samoa, Hawaii, the isthmian canal, the Midway Islands, and, after
the war with Spain, Wake, Guam, and Manila, were all closely inter-
related in the minds of naval planners. Theodore Roosevelt, three years
before he entered the Navy Department, connected Samoa with an
isthmian canal, a base at Hawaii, and a big navy.28 Commodore Robert
W. Shufeldt, the man who opened up Korea to American penetration
in 1882, wrote to Navy Secretary Thompson two years earlier expressing
his belief that "the acquisition of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, the
treaties with Japan, Sandwich Islands and Samoa, are only corollaries
to the proposition that the Pacific Ocean is to become at no distant day
the commercial domain of America."29 When that day came, a base at
Pago Pago, to protect the trade routes to the South Pacific and to help
defend the western approaches to the canal, would be a necessity.
By 1886, however, it was evident that only strong and decisive action
by the United States could prevent a European rival from seizing Samoa.
Germany, newly hungry for colonies, had intervened aggressively in
Samoan politics. The native king, Malietoa Laupepa, had been driven
from the seat of government, and one Tamasese set up as pretender to
the throne. German marines had hauled down the Samoan flag in the
face of the protests of the British and American consuls. Fearing the
imminent annexation of the islands by Germany, or at least the estab-
lishment of a German protectorate, President Grover Cleveland and
Secretary Bayard decided to act. Minister Pendleton at Berlin was cabled
to demand from the German government assurances "that Germany
seeks no exclusive control in Samoa." The United States expected
Germany to do nothing in Samoa to impair American rights under the
1878 treaty.30 With this cable, the United States government was
intervening directly for the first time in Samoan affairs. This intervention
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marked the first step leading up to the 1887 Washington Conference
on Samoa.
The Washington Conference of June 25 to July 26, 1887, attended by
representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and Germany,
accomplished nothing of enduring significance. The conference did,
however, serve the obvious American purpose of forestalling any
immediate German annexation of Samoa. Germany suspended hostilities
in the islands and agreed, temporarily at least, to maintenance of the
Samoan status quo. At the conference, however, Germany and Great
Britain (which had reached a prior agreement with regard to Pacific and
African colonies that included British support for a German mandate in
Samoa) presented the United States with a united front in favor ot
German control of the islands. Secretary Bayard resisted such a develop-
ment adamantly, and the conference adjourned without a settlement
having been reached. However, before the adjournment the American
Secretary of State presented the German and British representatives
with a clear picture of why the United States would not allow the
Samoan Islands to slip into German hands. Both Germany and Great
Britain already possessed a number of island outposts in the South
Pacific, Bayard pointed out, while the United States, whose interest was
"very great and quite equal to any other," had none. As for Samoa,
Bayard declared "that the importance of these islands is mainly because
of their geographical position. They lie in the pathway of a commerce
that is just being developed." He connected Samoa with the Pacific coast
and isthmian trade of the United States. "The opening of the west coast
of North America to civilization and commerce by means of the trans-
continental railways," he declared, "had given to this group of islands
an interest which they never had before, and, moreover, we all hope for
the penetration of the isthmus in some way or other. If that occurs, a
new feature of interest will be added to them." The Secretary's final
words on the subject further indicate the strategic and commercial
importance which the United States expected Samoa to acquire at some
time in the near future: "There is something beyond the mere material
present value of the land or the products, and it was for that reason that
the United States desired to see that group of islands maintained for the
common use of nations."31
American concern for Samoa's continued independence was hardly
assuaged by the fruitless outcome of the Washington Conference. Nor
was the situation helped by the resumption of German interference in
Samoan affairs in the aftermath of the conference. Malietoa Laupepa
was deported from his little kingdom, and the German puppet Tamasese,
supported by German warships and 700 German marines, set about
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solidifying his hold on the throne. In the late summer of 1888 a new
revolt broke out in the islands, led by a chieftain named Mataafa. While
most of the American press spoke out against further involvement of the
United States in these far-off islands, certain newspapers began to
demand action. The Atlanta Constitution warned of a German scheme
aimed at "crowding us out of what promised to be a very valuable
trading post." The Philadelphia Press predicted that failure to act now
would "probably be a matter of regret" fifty years hence, "when the
United States, China, and Australia divide the Pacific."32 Forceful
German incursions on Samoan independence continued through 1888,
however, despite American protests. On January 5, 1889, a cable was
received in Washington from the American consul at Apia. The cable
reported a bloody clash between German sailors and Mataafa's rebels,
which had left twenty Germans dead and thirty wounded. The outraged
Germans had sworn vengeance and were "shelling and burning indis-
criminately." They were not respecting the rights of American nationals.
A naval squadron was requested.33
The situation in Samoa in January 1889 made it encumbent upon the
United States to act if it wished to forestall again German annexation
of the archipelago. Two steps were taken by the Cleveland administra-
tion in this direction. The warship Trenton was dispatched to Apia; and
the President, long an opponent of American overseas expansion, sent
a message to Congress placing the whole annoying Samoan problem in
the hands of the legislative branch. Cleveland communicated to the
Congress in strong terms his own view that "the autonomy and indepen-
dence of Samoa should be scrupulously preserved." In addition, he
reminded that body that the Samoan archipelago lay "in the direct
highway of a growing and important commerce between Australia and
the United States."34 Even Grover Cleveland, apparently, was aware of
the potential of Samoa as a stepping-stone to the entrepots of the South
Pacific.
In the ensuing Senate debates, the subject of Samoa's ultimate role
in an American-dominated Pacific was brought up time and again. John
Sherman of Ohio urged that the United States not give up its hard-won
foothold at Pago Pago.35 Senator William P. Frye of Maine contended
that once the isthmian canal was built, Samoa would be "of infinitely
greater importance to our interests" than Hawaii, because of Samoa's
supposed position "exactly in line" between the isthmus and Asia and
Australia.36 John H. Reagan of Texas demanded that his colleagues
consider not just the present value of Samoa to the United States, but
"what our future interests . . . may be." The Central American isthmus
would soon be pierced, Reagan said, bringing "the people of the islands
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of the Pacific into closer relations with . . . the people of the United
States. . . . Our relations to them commercially and geographically make
it to our interest that the control of the islands of the Pacific should not
be absolutely absorbed by the powers of Europe."37 The most outspoken
advocate of a tough policy in Samoa, however, was Senator Joseph N.
Dolph of Oregon, who went so far as to suggest that the Monroe Doctrine
be extended to encompass Samoa. Someday, Dolph asserted, China,
Japan, Australia, and the islands of the Pacific would be the commercial
neighbors of the west coast of the United States. "It is difficult now to
conceive of the vast fleet of merchant vessels which will be required for
the extensive commerce which will spring up in the near future," he
said, "when these islands are peopled by the Caucasian race, the soil
cultivated, and their resources developed." Because Samoa lay directly
on the track of commerce from the west coast of the United States and
from the isthmus to Asia and the South Pacific, it could not be allowed
to pass under the control of any other power. Moreover, Samoa in
German hands would put a German fleet thousands of miles closer to
the west coast of the United States, and to the future interoceanic canal,
than would otherwise be the case.38
The outcome of the Congressional debates of January 1889 was an
appropriation of $500,000 for the protection of American lives and
property in Samoa, and another of $100,000 for the development of the
harbor at Pago Pago. President Cleveland's actions in submitting the
Samoan affair to the Congress, meanwhile, had led to a determination by
Bismarck that something be done to head off the threat of a confrontation
between Germany and the United States. The Germans suspended
hostilities against Mataafa, and a new conference on Samoa was called
to meet at Berlin in late April. Cleveland and Bayard accepted Bismarck's
proposal for a tripartite conference. It was left to the incoming Re-
publican administration of Benjamin Harrison, with Harrison's Secretary
of State James G. Blaine, to determine the American position at Berlin.
Even more than that of Cleveland and Bayard, the attitude of Harrison
and Blaine toward the Samoan problem was based upon an appreciation
of America's future role in the Pacific. In his instructions to the American
commissioners to the Berlin Conference, Secretary Blaine, always an
advocate of an expansive American foreign policy, declared that "the
interests of the United States require the possession of a naval station
in these remote parts of the Pacific." American commerce with Asia was
developing "largely and rapidly," and "the certainty of an early opening
of an Isthmian transit from the Atlantic to the Pacific (under American
protection) must create changes in which no power can be more directly
interested than the United States." Because of its dawning preeminence
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in the area, "in any question involving present or future relations in the
Pacific, this Government can not accept even temporary subordination."
No regime could be instituted in Samoa which threatened to check the
development of a strong American presence there.39
The end result of the 1889 Berlin Conference was the Act of Berlin,
by which the three powers agreed to a tripartite protectorate over Samoa.40
The United States thereby entered into a pact that ran counter to the
whole American tradition of shunning entangling alliances. The explana-
tion is that in 1889 joint control was seen to be the only way to forestall
the islands' falling under the exclusive dominion of Germany. Since the
United States was not willing to see that happen, the Harrison adminis-
tration was forced to accept tripartite control as the only feasible
alternative.
The remainder of the story of American involvement in Samoa in
the last years of the 19th Century can be quickly told. As American
wealth and power grew in the 1890s, the American presence at Samoa
increasingly came to fit into a larger pattern of American military and
commercial interests in the Pacific. Grover Cleveland, back again in the
White House, grew tired of the continuing instability in the islands
under the new government. Pointing to "the impolicy of entangling
alliance," he twice recommended to the Congress that the United States
withdraw from the tripartite protectorate.41 But on both occasions the
Congress ignored Cleveland's advice. A number of senators and con-
gressmen lashed out at even the suggestion of withdrawal, citing in
almost every instance Samoa's future importance to American interests
in the Pacific. Representative W. F. Draper of Massachusetts warned
that the United States was "the only great power interested in the Pacific
trade which has not had the wisdom to acquire territory in localities
where the great trade of the future will need guarding and supplying."
To protect such trade, Draper urged the acquisition of naval bases at
Samoa, Hawaii, the western terminus of the proposed canal, and at the
Straits of Magellan. From these bases, he concluded, "a properly
organized fleet . . . will hold the Pacific as an American ocean, dominated
by American commercial enterprise for all time."42 The expansionist
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge also was certain of Samoa's importance as
a strategic linchpin in the overall pattern of an American Pacific empire.
In an 1895 article castigating the foreign policy of the Cleveland
administration, Lodge declared that Samoa, while less important than
Hawaii, was still of serious consequence to American military and com-
mercial interests in the Pacific. "The wisdom of maintaining not only a
naval station, but our commercial influence in the Samoan group, has
long been apparent," he said. In Lodge's view, an American naval and
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commercial presence at Samoa was closely associated with an isthmian
canal, and with bases at Hawaii and in the Caribbean. The canal should
be built, Lodge asserted; and for its protection "at least one strong naval
station" should be established in the Caribbean. For the defense of the
canal in the west, and "for the sake of our commercial supremacy in the
Pacific we should control the Hawaiian Islands and maintain our in-
fluence in Samoa."43 While Lodge was expressing these sentiments,
Henry C. Ide, the former Chief Justice of the Samoan Supreme Court,
was seeking to inform the American public as to the country's stake in
Samoa. "Samoa stands as a sentinel and outpost in the vast southern sea,
just as Hawaii does in the northern," Ide wrote. "If it is appropriated
by any foreign power we have no foothold left south of the equator."
The commercial future of the Pacific was "measureless," and Samoa was
to serve as a vital element in securing the trade of that immense region
for the United States. Finally, as coal was treated as a contraband of war,
and since modern warships were absolutely dependent on coal supplies,
unless the American grasp on Pago Pago was retained the whole of the
South Pacific would be closed to the United States the instant war was
declared by any naval power.44
The Spanish-American War and the imperialist surge that followed
brought the culmination of the policy the United States had been
pursuing in Samoa for twenty years. Since the 1870s, the United States
had been seeking to thwart any annexation of the islands by a European
power until American public opinion was ready to approve the acquisi-
tion of the harbor of Pago Pago by the United States. By the end of the
century, the American public, its appetite for insular expansion whetted
by the acquisition of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines, was
prepared to sanction such a move. This change in public opinion explains
the ease with which the McKinley administration secured Senate
approval of the 1899 treaty by which Germany and the United States
divided the islands between them, the island of Tutuila, with its harbor
of Pago Pago, going to the United States.45 President McKinley, in his
Annual Message of 1899, had high praise for the terms of the treaty.
"To relinquish our rights in the harbor of Pago Pago, the best anchorage
in the Pacific," the President declared, "was not to be thought of either
as regards the needs of our Navy or the interests of our growing com-
merce with the East."46 McKinley's Secretary of State, John Hay
expressed comparable satisfaction. "Our interest in Pago Pago," he told
the American ambassador in London, " . . . was of the most vital
importance. It is the finest harbor in the Pacific and absolutely indis-
pensable to us."47
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Since President Grant sent Meade's treaty of 1872 to the Senate for
ratification, then, a succession of American officials had believed that
the future welfare of the United States would somehow be affected by
what happened in Samoa. Though the immediate interests of the United
States in the South Pacific were infinitesimal throughout the period, the
conviction persisted that one day soon the area would be the scene of
tremendous political and commercial events. The destiny of the United
States, its future economic greatness and its success against jealous rival
powers, would be determined in the vast expanses of the western ocean.
This belief in Pacific Destiny explains why the United States for over a
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